Neville Meaney
The Communist leadership could remake itself as an
anti-Western nationalist party, struggling against US–led encirclement
There is a large body of opinion that holds that the 21st Century
is to be the Asian or Asia-Pacific century and that China will be the prime
driving force in creating a new regional order. In the eyes of many, Napoleon’s
famous prediction that when the sleeping giant China awoke it would shake the
world seems to be about to come true.
It is widely held that if China’s GDP continues to grow at the
rate achieved in the last three decades it will, by 2030, if not earlier,
overtake that of the United States. This has led to many commentators
forecasting that China, like all rising great powers, would in due course
demand its place in the sun.
This conclusion — based on a simple linear projection of China’s
economic development under a stable government and a similarly simple
assumption that China could parlay its economic power into political influence
— ignores internal social and political dynamics. The Chinese
communist-capitalists have not yet experienced the normal busts which follow
the booms of the free market system. They have not experienced a major economic
recession, let alone a great depression, though some argue that the protests
leading up to the Tiananmen Square massacre were precipitated by an economic
downturn. When such a major nationwide economic crisis does take place, it is
likely that all the socio-psychological tensions inherent in modernisation will
come to the fore and the Communist Party’s right to govern will be tested to
the full.
It is questionable whether the Communist Party will be able to
retain its “Mandate of Heaven.” As the history of nationalism in the West and
Japan shows, modernising peoples at the critical point of transformation need
new myths to give meaning to their new world and to legitimise their allegiance
to the state. But these myths have to be credible. Although the Marxist
philosophy of the Chinese revolution still informs the rites and symbols of the
state, this definition of China has to a very large extent lost its virtue. In
schools and universities the required courses on Marxism are no more than empty
formalities. In the country at large the practice of capitalism has made a
mockery of the promise of communism.
The Communist leaders, recognising this, have already taken steps
to strengthen their claims to be nationalists. They suppress ethnic Tibetan,
Uighur, and Mongolian secessionists in their western outlying provinces, defy
Western critics who make heroes of Chinese intellectual dissenters, and
denounce Japan’s school readers that downplay its imperial past, especially its
responsibility for the Nanjing massacre. Indeed, the latest Chinese history
textbooks in Shanghai make gestures towards a new nationalist sensibility. The
controlling narrative is no longer set in terms of class warfare, of the
Marxist dialectic of slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism but rather
takes the evolution of Chinese civilisation, of the Han people’s 5000 years of
continuous history, as the central unifying principle. They have to a large
extent expunged the peasant revolts from the story and instead heap praise on
those who have fought for Confucian unity and harmony.
What will proceed from this discarding of the post-1950
revolutionary myth is unclear. Some Western scholars, especially Americans, are
inclined to see liberal economics leading to liberal politics and the Chinese
moving step by step towards something approaching a Western type of democracy.
If these optimists prove to be correct then Francis Fukuyama’s claim that the
fall of the Soviet Union marked the “end of history” might seem more
plausible.
But lacking any experience of multi-party democracy, peaceful
transfers of power, loyal oppositions, separation of the executive and the
judiciary, or a free press, this self-flattering Western vision does not seem
to offer a feasible prospect. Even a movement towards a reformation which
releases the hold of the Communist Party over the reins of power is more likely
to create chaos and war-lordism than an effective liberal state.
The more likely outcome is that the Communist Party will, by
attempting to exploit a widely shared folk memory of a 200 year history of
humiliation at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists, remake itself as
an anti-Western nationalist party, struggling against Western encirclement. But
whether this transition would be achieved without stirring up internal
divisions is an open question. There is considerable hostility towards the
so-called “princelings,” namely the highly privileged children of the Communist
Party heroes who endured the Long March and fought to create the People’s
Republic. Much will depend on the People’s Liberation Army.
If the ideological revolution, by whatever means, were carried
through peacefully, then the new rulers might create an authoritarian or
totalitarian nationalist regime not unlike those that spread through
continental Europe in the first half of the last century. If this were to be
the case then it would in all likelihood suppress even more rigorously the
non-Han ethnic communities in the western provinces, annex Taiwan, push more
forcefully for control over the disputed rocky outcrops and the surrounding
seabed resources in the South and East China seas, and demand respect for the
Chinese diaspora in South-East Asia.
The first is fully within its power. The second, analogous to
Hitler’s march into Austria, might well be accomplished without American
intervention; the West has already conceded in principle that Taiwan is a
province of China. The third would be riskier in that it would stir up anti-Chinese
feeling along the whole western Pacific and would produce a much greater
possibility of American intervention. The last, though responding to strong
domestic national feelings, would, if the Chinese were to attempt to use force
or threats of force, face them with logistical difficulties. It would have the
effect of uniting South-East Asia against the Chinese, and cause the Americans
to take counter measures. This alternative, though it might seem to have some
similarities to Nazi Germany’s claims on Sudetenland, is not for a number of
reasons comparable.
Would the hubris of superpower nationalism tempt China to take
great risks? Would it replicate the irrationality and fanaticism of the
Japanese in the era of the Pacific War? The greatest deterrent to such
aggressive actions, especially in the case of the last two possibilities, would
be the recognition that any military confrontation between China and America,
even if begun with conventional weapons, could contain within it the likelihood
of escalation to some form of a nuclear war.
To be sure, in drawing a comparison between the European and
Japanese nationalist response to the crisis of modernisation and that of China,
one should take into account the changed nature of the contemporary
international framework. Unlike the League of Nations, the United Nations has a
near universal membership and has a very active role not only in humanitarian,
social welfare, health, and cultural affairs but also in peacekeeping and peace
enforcing, even if in the latter respect this has only been accepted for very
small failed states.
Today, there are also other international institutions such as the
IMF and the WTO which regulate specific elements of international relations.
Moreover, in every region of the world, there are other government-sponsored
organisations which aim at fostering co-operation and mediating local disputes.
Further, as a result of the globalisation of the world’s economies and the
widespread systems of digital communication, many people are connected across
national frontiers and are linked by an extensive range of professional and
other Non-Government Organisations. There is also a growing awareness that
nations have a common interest in co-operating to solve problems that affect
the survival of the planet, such as global warming, environmental destruction,
pandemics, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
But even after making allowance for these significant steps
towards global peace and justice, it is important to recognise that the process
of modernisation in East Asia, as in other parts of the developing world, is
still proceeding. It seems not impossible that a rising great power such as
China might still adopt an aggressive nationalism that would menace the region
and even bring about military conflict.
Source: American
Review Aril 2014
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